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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CHAD A. GARDINER, 
Defendant-Petitioner. 
Case No. 890231 
Category No. 13 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals which affirmed defendant's 
conviction of assault on a peace officer under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102.4 (Supp. 1989) by order dated April 14, 1989 (R. 28). 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENT FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the court of appeals correctly rule that 
"[d]efendant had no right to resist a peaceful search, regardless 
of whether that search might ultimately be determined legal or 
illegal, unless defendant can show that the officer was not 
reasonably identified as a police officer, was not acting 
pursuant to his authority, or had used excessive force?" 
2. Did the court of appeals properly uphold the trial 
court's conclusion that "the officer reasonably acted to preserve 
his own safety when he pushed defendant away and that the force 
used was not excessive?" 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of constitutional and statutory 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented 
for review is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Chad A. Gardiner, was charged with two 
counts of assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (Supp. 1989), one count of 
interference with a peace officer making a lawful arrest, a class 
B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp. 1989), and 
one count of intoxication, a class C misdemeanor, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-701 (Supp. 1989) (R. 7). After a bench trial in 
circuit court, defendant was found guilty of one count of assault 
on a peace officer and of interference with a peace officer 
making a lawful arrest; the court found him not guilty on the 
remaining counts (R. 16). Defendant was sentenced to a term of 
one year in the Uintah County Jail and fined $400 (plus $100 
surcharge) for the assault on a peace officer conviction; 
however, the court suspended execution of that sentence and 
placed defendant on probation (R. 19). There is nothing in the 
record to indicate what sentence, if any, the court imposed for 
the interference with a peace officer conviction. 
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Utah Court of 
Appeals (R. 20). In an order issued pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 
31, the court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction of 
assault on a peace officer (R. 27, 28). For some unexplained 
reason, the court of appeals did not address the interference 
conviction, and neither party sought correction of this apparent 
oversight. 
This Court granted defendant's petition for a writ of 
certiorari (R. 30). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court's findings of fact, which generally are 
not challenged by defendant, were as follows: 
1. At approximately 8:00 a.m. on April 17, 1989, 
Deputy Lytle of the Uintah County Sheriff's Department, 
[sic] was dispatched to the Vernal City Airport. Deputy 
Lytle was dispatched on a complaint by an unidentified 
citizen that a loud party was in process at the airport and 
that minors were consuming alcohol. 
2. Vernal City Officer Steve Hatzidakis and Reserve 
Officer Terry Shiner, [sic] responded to assist Deputy Lytle 
at the airport and were provided the above information 
concerning the party. 
3. The officers located a party which involved from 30 
to 50 people. The party was apparently being held at the 
Dinaland Aviation Building. There were numerous people 
outside the building, some of which were in the vicinity of 
airplanes which were parked near the building. 
4. Officer Hatzidakis initially located two 
individuals within a vehicle near the above building. Upon 
contact, the officer found that one of the individuals was 
obviously very intoxicated from the consumption of alcohol. 
5. Deputy Lytle initially contacted another vehicle 
where he found an open container of alcohol in the vehicle. 
6. While the officers were in the process of making 
contact with the vehicles, someone began to close the door 
to the Aviation Building. Officer Hatzidakis requested 
Reserve Officer Shiner, [sic] to investigate this action. 
Deputy Shiner responded to the building and made contact 
with several individuals in the vicinity of the doorway (one 
of which was a member of a band which was apparently 
performing at the party). 
Defendant does not attack any of the trial court's findings of 
fact, except for its finding that the force used against 
defendant by one of the arresting officers was not excessive but 
reasonable under the circumstances (R. 16 at 2). 
7. Officer Hatzidakis also went to the doorway of the 
Aviation Building. Upon his arrival at the doorway, he 
observed a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. 
8. Upon looking inside the building, Officer 
Hatzidakis, [sic] observed one or two individuals who 
appeared to be minors. The Court has observed some of the 
persons who were within the building and finds that at least 
one of the individuals who was within the building at the 
time Officer Hatzidakis looked in, reasonably appeared to be 
a minor. 
9. After observing persons who he believed to be 
minors within the building, after having observed the 
general use of alcohol in the area, and after having noted a 
heavy odor of alcohol at the entrance to the building, 
Officer Hatzidakis announced his intention to enter the 
premises to check the area within the building for minors. 
Officer Hatzidakis informed those present of the 
reasons that he had dispatched to the area (this involved a 
loud party and the consumption of alcohol by minors). 
10. The defendant, who was within the building, then 
informed Officer Hatzidakis that his father owned the 
Dinaland Aviation Building. The defendant also gave Officer 
Hatzidakis his name. The foregoing exchange between the 
officer and the defendant occurred at the doorway or just 
inside the door. 
11. During the exchange of information between the 
defendant and Officer Hatzidakis, the defendant inquired as 
to whether the officer possessed a warrant. When he was 
informed by the officer that the officer had no warrant, the 
defendant announced that the [o]fficer could not enter the 
premises. At about that time, the defendant stepped within 
8 to 10 inches of Officer Hatzidakis and reached his arm out 
to his side to a table in order to prevent the officer from 
entering. The demeanor of the defendant was hostile and 
threatening. 
12. Officer Hatzidakis reasonably perceived the action 
of defendant to be a threat to his safety and in response to 
defendant's actions, shoved the defendant away. The Court 
finds that the force used was not excessive and that it was 
reasonable in view of the circumstances. 
13. The defendant, after having recovered from the 
shove by Officer Hatzidakis, came forward and struck Officer 
Hatzidakis in the face with his (defendant's) fist. The 
force of the defendant's blow and the resulting contact 
between the defendant and Officer Hatzidakis, [sic] knocked 
the officer outside where an altercation occurred between 
the defendant and all three police officers who were 
present. 
14. During the altercation, Officer Hatzidakis 
informed the defendant that he was under arrest. Defendant 
heard and understood this announcement and answered that he 
was not under arrest. After having been informed of his 
arrest, the defendant vigorously resisted arrest and in the 
process again struck Officer Hatzidakis in the face with his 
(defendant's) fist. 
15. Dinaland Aviation has at least three exits to the 
building. There were from 30 to 40 people present. 
Approximately 15 to 20 people were located within the 
building or immediately adjacent (at the doorway) to the 
building. The remaining individuals were scattered around 
the parking lot and airplane storage area which was adjacent 
to the building. 
16. The Dinaland Aviation building is a commercial 
building which is not used as a residence. The building is 
used to accommodate parties two or three times a year. 
(R. 16 at 1-3) . 
The court made the following conclusions of law: 
1. Officer Hatzidakis had probable cause to believe 
that alcohol was being used and consumed within the building 
known as Dinaland Aviation and that alcohol was located in 
the building. 
2. Officer Hatzidakis had probable cause to believe 
that minors were located within the building known as 
Dinaland Aviation. 
3. Officer Hatzidakis had received information from an 
anonymous informant that minors were consuming alcohol. 
4. Officer Hatzidakis had received additional 
information regarding the activity at Dinaland Aviation that 
morning, which information had been verified to be accurate. 
5. Officer Hatzidakis had probable cause to believe 
that there were minors within the building known as Dinaland 
Aviation who had consumed alcohol. 
6. In light of all the circumstances, which include 
the early morning hours, the fact that there were only three 
police officers present, the fact that there were at least 
three exits to the hanger[,] the fact that there were 
numerous people who were spread over a wide area in the 
vicinity of the building, the fact that it was a commercial 
building, the fact that the officer had probable cause to 
believe that the offense was occurring in his presence, the 
probability that evidence and individuals would not be 
available if a Warrant was obtained, and all other facts 
surrounding this event, the Court finds that it was 
reasonable to enter without first obtaining a Warrant. 
Additional factors which the Court considered are noted on 
the record on the hearing held July 15, 1988. 
(R. 16 at 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals correctly affirmed defendant's 
conviction of assault on a peace officer on the ground that 
defendant had no right to forcibly resist a search by a peace 
officer in the performance of his duties, even though the search 
was subsequently determined to be illegal. 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's conviction of 
interference with a peace officer making a lawful arrest is also 
sustainable. 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
The order issued by the court of appeals affirms only 
defendant's conviction of assault on a peace officer; it does not 
address defendant's conviction of interference with a peace 
officer. This appears to have been an oversight, as defendant 
clearly challenged both of his convictions in that court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT HAD NO RIGHT UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES TO RESIST THE SEARCH CONDUCTED 
BY ONE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS. 
Defendant claims that the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that under the circumstances, defendant had no right 
to resist the entry into the Dinaland Aviation building by one of 
the arresting officers. First, he argues that the following 
conclusion of the court of appeals conflicts with this Court's 
decision in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975): 
Defendant had no right to resist a peaceful 
search, regardless of whether that search 
might ultimately be determined legal or 
illegal, unless defendant can show that the 
officer was not reasonably identified as a 
police officer, was not acting pursuant to 
his authority, or had used excessive force. 
Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Alaska 
1983). Accord U.S. v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381, 
390 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert, denied 402 U.S. 
1008 (1971); State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 583 
P.2d 464, 466-7 (1978) . 
State v. Gardiner, No. 880557-CA, slip op. at 2 (Utah Ct. App. 
April 14, 1989) (unpublished "Order of Affirmance") (R. 28 at 2). 
Second, he contends that Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 (1978) 
(defense of property) provides an independent justification for 
his resistance to the officer's entry. Third, he argues that, 
because the officer lacked a legal basis to make a warrantless 
entry into the building, that entry was unlawful under the fourth 
amendment, and the officer was therefore acting outside the scope 
of his authority. Finally, he maintains that his resistance was 
justified under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1978) (self-defense) 
because the officer used excessive force to effect the entry. 
Each of these arguments will be addressed separately. 
As noted by the court of appeals, on appeal to that 
court the parties focused on the legality of the officer's entry 
into the Dinaland Aviation building, apparently assuming that the 
answer to that question would be dispositive. However, the court 
of appeals determined otherwise. Although it "agree[d] with 
defendant that there were no exigent circumstances that permitted 
the police officer to legally conduct a warrantless search of the 
premises for alcohol being served to minors/' it concluded that 
M[t]he legality or illegality of the search cannot justify 
defendant's conduct nor excuse his offense." Gardiner, slip op. 
at 1 (R. 28). In addition to the statement quoted above 
regarding the defendant's right to resist a peaceful search, the 
court of appeals said: 
We reject defendant's argument that he 
is entitled to resist a search which he deems 
to be illegal. Any traditional common law 
sanction for such conduct is anachronistic 
and no longer justifiable. See People v. 
Hess, 687 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1984). When 
society has provided other adequate legal 
means to obtain an impartial review and 
resolution of legal disputes, the necessity 
for a self-help remedy, such as physically 
resisting an officer who is performing his 
duty, is radically dissipated. Our society 
need no longer tolerate such efforts. 
Ellison v. State, 410 P.2d 519, 525 (Del. 
Super. 1979). The resistance to a 
questionable search or arrest can lead to 
violence and injury, as in this case. Self-
help may well invite graver consequences to 
the accused and the officer than any injury 
occasioned by the search or arrest itself. 
State v. Doe, 583 P.2d at 467; State v. 
Hatton, 116 Ariz. 142, 568 P.2d 1040, 1045-46 
(1977) . 
Gardiner, slip op. at 2-3 (R. 28 at 2-3). Defendant maintains 
that the lower court's holding on this point is contrary to this 
Court's decision in State v. Bradshaw. 
I n
 Bradshaw, the Court had before it the question of 
whether the predecessor to current Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 
2 
(Supp. 1989) was unconstitutionally vague. In holding that the 
statute was defective in that respect, the Court focused on two 
of its parts, including the phrase: "regardless of whether there 
is a legal basis for the arrest." Regarding this phrase, the 
lead opinion, in dictum, observed: 
If the intention of the legislature was to 
penalize a law-abiding citizen by 
incarceration because he did not willingly 
submit to an unlawful arrest, a statute 
authorizing the same is in violation of both 
the Utah and United States Constitutions 
. . . in that it permits and authorizes an 
arrest without probable cause and without 
lawful basis for the arrest. 
541 P.2d at 801 (Tuckett, J., joined by Maughan, J.). In a 
separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Henriod clearly agreed 
with this dictum, thus giving it majority support. 541 P.2d at 
802-05 (Henriod, C.J., concurring). 
This language of Bradshaw, which admittedly suggests 
that a majority of the Court adopted the common law rule that a 
person could resist an unlawful arrest with impunity, is only 
dictum and does not represent the holding of Bradshaw. The 
holding of that case is limited to the issue of the statute's 
vagueness. Therefore, whatever relevance Bradshaw may have to 
the question of a person's right to forcibly resist an unlawful 
search by a peace officer, it does not have the precedential 
2 
Former section 76-8-305 read: 
A person is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor when he intentionally interferes 
with a person recognized to be a law 
enforcement official seeking to effect an 
arrest or detention of himself or another 
regardless of whether there is a legal basis 
for the arrest. 
value defendant wishes to attribute to it. See/ e.g., State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 400 (Utah 1989) ("The referenced language 
in the lead opinion [of State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1200-01 
(Utah 1984),] was dictum only."). Bradshaw simply did not 
determine the question of whether a person may resist an unlawful 
search or seizure (including arrest). 
This Court must decide what appears to be a question of 
first impression in Utah: does a person have a right to resist 
an unlawful search of a non-dwelling by a peace officer without 
the threat of punishment under the criminal laws? See State v. 
Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 985 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (observing that 
the issue of whether a private citizen has a right to resist an 
unlawful arrest has not been resolved in Utah). Because there is 
no direct statutory authority in the current criminal code upon 
which to decide this question, a resolution must be fashioned 
3 
purely by judicial decision. 
Under the common law, a person had che right to use 
force to resist an unlawful arrest. Regina v. Tooley, 2 Ld. 
Raymond Rep. 1296, 1299-1301 (Q.B. 1709). See also People v. 
Hess, 687 P.2d 443, 445 (Colo. 1984); State v. Gallagher, 465 
A.2d 323, 327 (Conn. 1983). Although a number of states continue 
to follow the common law rule, see, e.g., Brown v. City of 
Oklahoma City, 721 P.2d 1346 (Okl. App.), cert, granted and 
denied, 721 P.2d 1356 (Okl. 1986), the modern view, adopted by a 
The applicability of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-402 (self-defense), 
76-2-405 (defense of habitation), 76-2-406 (defense of property), 
and 76-8-305 (1978 & Supp. 1989) to the specific facts of this 
case is necessarily limited by the language of those provisions. 
Each will be discussed below. 
clear majority of the states either by legislative enactment or 
judicial decision, is that a person may not resist an unlawful 
arrest which is accomplished without excessive force. See 
Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596, 599-600, 447 N.E.2d 1224, 
1227 (1983) (collecting cases and statutes); Brown v. City of 
Oklahoma City, 721 P.2d at 1355-56 (Stubblefield, J., dissenting) 
(same). The Moreira court explained the modern view as follows: 
[T]he trend in this country has been away 
from the old rule [established in Regina v. 
Tooley in 1709] and toward the resolution of 
disputes in court. Since 1709, society has 
changed. In this era of constantly expanding 
legal protection of the rights of the accused 
in criminal proceedings, an arrestee may be 
reasonably required to submit to a possibly 
unlawful arrest and to take recourse in the 
legal processes available to restore his 
liberty. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 
169, 183-184, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1965). 
State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 450-451, 
511 P.2d 263 (1973), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 
1163, 94 S.Ct. 928, 39 L.Ed.2d 117 (1974). 
An arrestee has the benefit of liberal bail 
laws, appointed counsel, the right to remain 
silent and to cut off questioning, speedy 
arraignment, and speedy trial. State v. 
Richardson, supra 95 Idaho at 450, 511 P.2d 
263. Columbus v. Fraley, 41 Ohio St.2d 173, 
179, 324 N.E.2d 735, cert, denied, 423 U.S. 
872, 95 S.Ct. 138, 48 L.Ed.2d 102 (1975). As 
a result of these rights and procedural 
safeguards, the need for the common law rule 
disappears — self help by an arrestee has 
become anachronistic. People v. Curtis, 70 
Cal.2d 347, 353, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 
33 (1969). In the Matter of the Welfare of 
Burns, 284 N.W.2d 359, 360 (Minn. 1979). As 
the New Jersey court wrote, self-help "is 
antisocial in an urbanized society." State 
v. Koonce, supra 89 N.J.Super, at 184, 214 
A.2d 428. 
388 Mass. at 599-600, 447 N.E.2d at 1226-27 (footnote omitted). 
In sum, the generally accepted, and better reasoned, rule is that 
in the absence of excessive or unnecessary 
force by an arresting officer, a person may 
not use force to resist an arrest by one who 
he knows or has good reason to believe is an 
authorized police officer, engaged in the 
performance of his duties, regardless of 
whether the arrest was unlawful in ^ :he 
circumstances. 
388 Mass. at 601, 447 N.E.2d at 1227. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
305 (Supp. 1989).4 
The principle that one generally has no right to resist 
arrest whether or not it is lawful has been extended by a number 
of courts to searches conducted with and without warrants. E.g. 
Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Alaska 1983) 
(warrantless search); State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 102-03, 583 P.2d 
464, 466-67 (N.M. 1978) (warrantless search); State v. Hatton, 
116 Ariz. 142, 147-48, 568 P.2d 1040, 1045-46 (Ariz. 1977) (en 
banc) (warrant search); United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381, 
Section 76-8-305 reads: 
A person is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor if he has knowledge or by the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to 
effect a lawful arrest or detention of 
himself or another and interferes with such 
arrest or detention by use of force or by use 
of any weapon. 
(Emphasis added). Whether the limitation to "lawful arrest" in 
this section reflects an implicit adoption by the legislature of 
the common law rule that a person has the right to resist an 
unlawful arrest is not clear. If that was the legislature's 
intent here, it is not clear that such resistance would be 
justified for purposes of any statute (e.g., section 76-5-
102*4 -- assault on a peace officer) other than section 76-8-305. 
In any event, this Court need not decide this question in 
order to resolve the issue of the right to resist an unlawful 
search which, as noted previously, is not directly controlled by 
any statutory authority. 
389-90 (3rd Cir.) (warrant search), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 1008 
(1971). In Elson, the court stated: 
[W]e hold that a private citizen may not use 
force to resist a peaceful search by one he 
knows or has good reason to believe is an 
authorized police officer performing his 
duties, regardless of whether the search is 
ultimately determined to be illegal. 
5 
659 P.2d at 1200 (footnote omitted). As explained in Doe, 
another warrantless search case: 
Self-help measures undertaken by a 
potential defendant who objects to the 
legality of the search can lead to violence 
and serious physical injury. The societal 
interest in the orderly settlement of 
disputes between citizens and their 
government outweighs any individual interest 
in resisting a questionable search. . . . 
One can reasonably be asked to submit 
peaceably and to take recourse in his legal 
remedies. 
92 N.M. at 102-03, 583 P.2d at 466-67 (citations omitted). And 
in the warrant search situation, the Ferrone court reasoned: 
Society has an interest in securing for 
its members the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Society 
also has an interest, however, in the orderly 
settlement of disputes between citizens and 
their government; it has an especially strong 
interest in minimizing the use of violent 
self-help in the resolution of those 
disputes. We think a proper accommodation of 
those interests requires that a person 
claiming to be aggrieved by a search 
5 The court added in a footnote: 
We again caution that this rule does not 
apply when the officer uses excessive or 
unnecessary force in conducting the search or 
when the search is attempted by one not known 
to be or not reasonably identifiable as a 
peace officer. 
659 P.2d at 1200 n.18 (citations omitted). 
conducted by a peace officer pursuant to an 
allegedly invalid warrant test that claim in 
a court of law and not forcibly resist the 
execution of the warrant at the place of 
search. 
438 F.2d at 390.6 
However, other courts have been reluctant to extend the 
principle to searches. For example, in State v. Gallagher, 465 
A.2d 323 (Conn. 1983), the Connecticut Supreme Court, while 
recognizing that a person has no right to resist an unlawful 
arrest under Connecticut law and that the arguments in favor of 
that approach "apply in some measure to resistance to an unlawful 
entry," held that it would "continue to adhere to the common law 
view that there are circumstances where unlawful warrantless 
intrusion into the home creates a privilege to resist, and that 
punishment of such resistance is therefore improper." Id., at 328 
Although Ferrone held that a person does not have a right to 
forcibly resist the execution of a search warrant by a peace 
officer, even though that warrant may subsequently be ruled 
invalid, .id. at 390, the court explicitly stated: 
We do not decide in this case: 
(a) Whether a person would, under some 
circumstances, have a right to resist an 
unlawful warrantless search; 
(b) Whether a person would, under some 
circumstances, have a right to resist an 
unlawful arrest made with or without a 
warrant; 
(c) Whether there may be some unlawful 
arrests or searches, with or without warrant, 
the circumstances of which would be such a 
provocation to a reasonable man that the 
seriousness of the offense of resistance 
ought to be mitigated as a result of such 
provocation. See, generally, Chevigny, Paul 
G., The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 
78 Yale L.J. 1128 (1969). 
Id. at 390 n.19 (emphasis in original). 
(citations omitted). The court "refused to abrogate the common 
law privilege to offer reasonable resistance, not rising to the 
level of an assault, to an unlawful entry." Ibid. It explained: 
Recognition of a limited right to resist 
an unlawful entry as a defense to a charge of 
interference seems to us to accommodate the 
competing claims of the common law and of our 
statutes. 
Id. at 329 n.7. Clearly, the court was most concerned about an 
unlawful entry into a private home. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals reached a similar 
conclusion in People v. Lutz, 762 P.2d 715 (Colo. App. 1988), 
where it drew a clear distinction between the right to resist an 
illegal arrest (no such right under People v. Hess, 687 P.2d 443 
(Colo. 1984)) and the "independent privilege to resist an 
unlawful intrusion into the sanctuary of a private home." I_d. at 
716 (citation omitted). Finding that the Colorado statute 
abrogating the right to resist an unlawful arrest is inapplicable 
where the forcible resistance is to prevent an unlawful entry, 
the court refused to create an exception to Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 18-1-705 (1986) -- which justified the use of reasonable and 
appropriate force to repel a trespasser in or upon a building --, 
whereby the statute would not apply when the unlawful entry is 
made by police officers. Id. at 717. The court considered "the 
topic to be one for legislative, not judicial, action." As was 
the court in Gallagher, the Lutz court was most concerned about 
an unlawful entry into one's home. 
With the foregoing in mind, this Court, in the context 
of the instant case, must decide a fairly narrow question: to 
what extent, if any, may a person resist an unlawful search of a 
non-dwelling by a peace officer? Although perhaps a closer 
question in the unlawful search context than in the unlawful 
arrest context, the policy considerations weigh in favor of the 
rule adopted in Elson and applied by the court of appeals to the 
facts of this case: in the absence of excessive force by an 
officer, a person may not use force to resist a search by one he 
knows or has reason to believe is an authorized peace officer 
performing his duties, regardless of whether the search is 
ultimately determined to be illegal. Even though valid 
distinctions may be drawn between an arrest and a search, see 
Lutz, 762 P.2d at 716-17; Gallagher, 465 A.2d at 327-28, and 
perhaps to a lesser extent between a search made pursuant to a 
warrant and a warrantless search, compare Brown, 721 P.2d at 
1351-52, with Ferrone, 438 F.2d at 389-90, a bright-line rule 
prohibiting forcible resistance to any unlawful search which is 
conducted without excessive force by the police will promote 
orderly, rather than violent, resolution of disputes over the 
legality of a particular search. Such a rule is particularly 
desirable given that the legality of a search, like that of an 
arrest, may often be a close question as to which even lawyers 
and judges may disagree. See Moreira, 388 Mass. at 600, 447 
N.E.2d at 1227. This sort of close question "is more properly 
decided by a [court] rather than by the participants in what may 
well be a highly volatile imbroglio." Ibid, (citations omitted). 
The bleak picture painted in opposition by the court in Brown, 
for example, is unrealistic in light of the well established 
legal remedies, both criminal and civil, that are available to 
the aggrieved individual and are specifically designed to deter 
and to punish police misconduct. See United State v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897 (1984) (absent objective good faith of officer, 
illegally seized evidence is to be suppressed); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1981) (under which a civil action for damages against police 
officers for federal constitutional violations is available). 
Individual officers may also be subject to administrative 
disciplinary action from their departments and the Division of 
Peace Officer Standards and Training (see Utah Code Ann. § 67-15-
10.5 (Supp. 1989)). 
In applying the rule argued for by the State to the 
instant case, the Court need only consider its application to the 
specific facts presented -- i.e., an illegal search of a non-
o 
dwelling. This is so because it is unclear whether Utah Code 
The majority in Brown writes: 
The alternative of denying the right [to 
forcibly resist an unlawful search], it seems 
to us, would create the potential for greater 
mischief -- a license for unrestrained 
wielding of arbitrary power eventually 
degenerating into gestapo and KGB type 
terrorism -- in short a police state. 
721 P.2d at 1352. 
g 
For purposes of this case, the State is willing to assume that 
the court of appeals was correct in its determination that the 
search by the officer was illegal due to the absence of exigent 
circumstances. This is so because the State firmly believes 
that, as a matter of policy, the Elson rule represents the better 
view. Under that rule, legality of the search is irrelevant. 
The State believes that it is important for this Court to decide 
whether the Elson rule should be adopted. 
Ann. S 76-2-405 (Supp. 1989) gives a person the right to resist 
an unlawful entry into his or her habitation when that entry is 
sought by a peace officer in the performance of the officer's 
duties. Section 76-2-405 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is justified in using force 
against another when and to the extent that 
he reasonably believers that the force is 
necessary to prevent or terminate the other's 
unlawful entry into or attack upon his 
habitation[.] . . . 
That provision does not include an explicit exception for peace 
officers in the performance of their duties, and whether this 
Court would create such an exception is a question better left 
for another day. Cjf. Lutz, 762 P. 2d at 717 (refusing to create 
an exception to a similar statute in Colorado). In the instant 
case, the trial court specifically found that the Dinaland 
Aviation building was not a residence (Finding of Fact No. 16; R. 
16 at 3), and defendant does not argue that section 76-2-405 
provides a justification for his actions. 
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of 
defendant's case, the court of appeals correctly upheld his 
conviction of assault on a peace officer. Under those same 
Cont. However, if the Court wishes to analyze the legality of 
the search as a predicate to its decision, the State maintains 
that the officer's warrantless entry was supported by probable 
cause (which is not challenged by defendant) and exigent 
circumstances. See State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987); 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-13 (1986) (unlawful for minor to possess 
or consume alcohol). Although admittedly a close question, the 
trial court's ruling that the search was legal was not clearly 
erroneous. See Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1269. Reversal of the court of 
appeals on this point would, of course, make it unnecessary to 
examine the validity of the Elson rule. Defendant does not argue 
that he had a right to resist a lawful search, and there appears 
to be no authority for such a position. 
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principles, defendant's conviction of interference with a peace 
officer is also sustainable. 
Looking first at the assault conviction, the trial 
court found defendant guilty of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
102.4 (Supp. 1989), which provides: 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, 
with knowledge that he is a peace officer, 
and when the peace officer is acting within 
the scope of his authority as a peace 
officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
As is clear from the court's findings of fact, defendant's 
assault against Officer Hatzidakis was related to defendant's 
efforts to prevent the officer from entering the Dinaland 
Aviation building to check for minors who the officer suspected 
were consuming alcohol. At trial, defendant argued that the 
officer's warrantless entry into the building was an unlawful 
search under the fourth amendment because, even assuming the 
officer had probable cause to support a search, the warrantless 
entry could not be justified due to the absence of exigent 
circumstances (R. 14). Defendant claimed that the unlawful 
entry, coupled with the alleged use of excessive force by the 
officer in making the entry, justified defendant's forcible 
resistance to that entry. The trial court rejected defendant's 
arguments, concluding that the officer's warrantless entry was 
supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances (R. 
16). 
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant presented 
essentially the same arguments as he did in the trial court. In 
its order of affirmance, issued pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 31, 
the court of appeals, without discussion of the trial court's 
findings of fact or conclusions of law, agreed with defendant 
that the absence of exigent circumstances rendered the officer's 
warrantless search illegal. However, noting that defendant had 
not challenged the trial court's findings that "the officer 
reasonably acted to preserve his own safety when he pushed 
defendant away and that the force used was not excessive," the 
court of appeals, applying Elson v. State and other similar cases 
discussed above, held that defendant was not justified in 
forcibly resisting the search. 
In this Court, defendant correctly argues that one may 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in business premises and 
thus enjoy certain protections under the fourth amendment. See 
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986). 
And, there is no dispute that a warrantless entry by police into 
a protected area in the absence of exigent circumstances, or some 
other recognized exception to the warrant requirement, 
constitutes an illegal search under the fourth amendment. See 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). As already 
noted, the court of appeals, assuming—as did defendant—that 
Officer Hatzidakis had probable cause to conduct a search, 
concluded that there were no exigent circumstances to justify his 
It is unclear why the court of appeals issued a summary order 
in this case under rule 31, given that the legal basis for its 
decision was one that had not been clearly developed in Utah. 
Indeed, as defendant pointed out in his petition for rehearing to 
the court of appeals, its d€?cision was arguably inconsistent with 
dictum in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975). 
warrantless search. Although this appears to be a very close 
question given the circumstances of the police encounter with 
defendant and others at the scene (see discussion in this brief, 
supra at n.8), cf_. State v. Ashe, the court of appeals 
properly concluded that the legality of the search was not the 
relevant issue. As previously discussed, the better rule is that 
which was applied by the court of appeals: a person may not use 
force to resist a search conducted without excessive force by one 
he knows or has reason to believe is an authorized peace officer 
performing his duties, regardless of whether the search is 
ultimately determined to be illegal. Because defendant makes no 
claim that he did not know or have reason to believe Officer 
Hatzidakis was a peace officer performing his duties, his 
forcible resistance to the search cannot be excused simply 
because the search may have been illegal. 
There also is some question about whether defendant had 
standing under the fourth amendment to object to what he believed 
was an illegal search. While the trial court specifically found 
that defendant informed Officer Hatzidakis that defendant's 
father owned the Dinaland Aviation building (Finding of Fact No. 
10; R. 16 at 2), it did not make a finding that defendant had 
either a proprietary or valid possessory interest in the premises 
such that he was in a position to assert a privacy interest 
protected by the fourth amendment. At trial, defendant's father 
testified that he gave defendant permission to have a party on 
those premises (T. 49); however, the court did not include that 
as one of its findings of fact, and defendant apparently never 
objected to that omission. Without that critical finding of 
fact, defendant has no basis upon which to claim a fourth 
amendment privacy interest in the premises Officer Hatzidakis 
sought to enter. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); 
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984). This, of course, 
seriously undermines defendant's argument that he had a right to 
resist an illegal search, assuming that such a right exists, for 
only those persons with a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the premises could claim the search was illegal as to them. 
Defendant erroneously claims that because the search 
was illegal, the State could not prove the officer was "acting 
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer," as 
required under section 76-5-102.4. Utah Code Ann. § 77-la-l(l) 
(Supp. 1989) defines a "peace officer" as: 
any employee of a police or law enforcement 
agency . . ., and whose duties consist 
primarily of the prevention and detection of 
crime and the enforcement of criminal 
statutes or ordinances of this state or any 
of its political subdivisions. 
That provision recognizes that a peace officer's duties include 
the enforcement of the criminal laws, precisely what Officer 
Hatzidakis sought to do in making the entry into the building. 
The better rule, as noted in State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz, at 148, 
568 P.2d 1046, is that simply because a search or seizure is 
subsequently judged to be unlawful, the officer is not deemed to 
be acting outside the scope of the officer's authority. A peace 
officer is engaged in the performance of official duties (i.e., 
acting within the officer's scope of authority) if the officer is 
"acting within the scope of what the agent is employed to do. 
The test is whether the agent is acting within that compass or is 
engaging in a personal frolic of his own." Ibid.(quoting United 
States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, 
388 U.S. 917 (1967)). See also State v. Doe, 92 N.M. at 103, 583 
P.2d at 467. Cf. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 
1056-57 (Utah 1989) (defining scope of employment). There is no 
evidence to support any conclusion other than that Officer 
Hatzidakis was conducting a good faith search, something that 
clearly comes within the scope of his duties and employment as a 
peace officer. 
Nor does Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 (1978) provide a 
justification for defendant's resistance to the search. That 
section provides: 
A person is justified in using force, 
other than deadly force, against another when 
and to the extent that he reasonably believes 
that force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate criminal interference with real 
property or personal property: 
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) Lawfully in the possession of a 
member of his immediate family; or 
(3) Belonging to a person whose property 
he has a legal duty to protect. 
There is no evidence of "criminal interference" by the officer. 
Defendant's citation to 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. 1989) (a copy of 
which is contained in the addendum to defendant's brief), as 
support for his contention that Officer Hatzidakis was guilty of 
criminal interference, is not persuasive, as there is no evidence 
that the officer "willfully" subjected defendant to the 
deprivation of a constitutional right. In short, the criminal 
intent necessary for conviction under section 242, see, e.g., 
United States v. Harrison, 671 F.2d 1159, 1161 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 847 (1982), simply was not present. 
For similar reasons, defendant's reliance on Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-402 (1978) is misplaced. That section states in 
pertinent part that: 
a person is justified in threatening or using 
force against another when and to the extent 
that he reasonably believes that such force 
is necessary to defend himself or a third 
person against such other's imminent use of 
unlawful force[.] 
Section 76-2-402(1) (emphasis added). Defendant's contention 
that he was justified in using force against the officer under 
this section is premised on his claim that the officer used 
excessive force to effect the entry. Whether the officer used 
excessive force is primarily a question of fact. See Graham v. 
Connor, U.S. , , 109 S.Ct. 1855, 1871-72 (1989); 
Calamia v. City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1035 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
This Court will set aside a trial court's finding of fact only 
when that finding is "clearly erroneous," that is when it is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). See also State v. Featherson, 781 
P.2d 424, 431-32 (Utah 1989). Defendant fails to cite this 
critical standard of review in attacking the trial court's 
finding that "the force used was not excessive and that it was 
reasonable in view of the circumstances" (Finding of Fact No. 12; 
R. 16 at 2). The record clearly contains adequate evidentiary 
support for the court's specific finding regarding the question 
of excessive force and the related findings of fact in support 
thereof (See Finding of Fact No. 11; R. 16 at 2). (T. 21-37). 
Because defendant cannot successfully attack the trial court's 
finding under the Walker standard, his self-defense claim under 
section 76-2-402 fails as well. 
In sum, defendant provides no basis for reversing the 
court of appeals' affirmance of his conviction of assault on a 
peace officer under section 76-5-102.4. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, defendant's 
challenge to his conviction of interference with a peace officer 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp. 1989) can be disposed of 
summarily. That section provides: 
A person is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to 
effect a lawful arrest or detention of 
himself or another and interferes with such 
arrest or detention by use of force or by use 
of any weapon. 
The only claim defendant has with regard to his conviction under 
this provision is that under the circumstances, the officer could 
not have made a "lawful arrest," and defendant was therefore 
justified in resisting an unlawful arrest. Assuming, arguendo, 
that one is not criminally liable under section 76-8-305 if the 
arrest is unlawful, defendant still cannot prevail. Because 
defendant had no right to forcibly resist the officer's entry 
into the Dinaland Aviation building--either under the Elson rule 
or because there was both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances to justify the warrantless search--, his arrest for 
assault under section 76-5-102.4 was lawful. There being no 
dispute that defendant interfered with that arrest by use of 
force, his conviction under 76-8-305 also should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. Insofar as that 
court's decision did not address defendant's conviction of 
interference with a peace officer under section 76-8-305, this 
Court should independently affirm that conviction. 
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